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Fairness versus Welfare (FW) aspires to be the new manifesto for normative law
and economics. The authors, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, both of Harvard
Law School, are two of the ﬁeld’s leaders. Fairness versus Welfare was previously
published as an article in the Harvard Law Review, after presentation at many
faculty workshops and symposia, and has prompted numerous book reviews and
responsive articles. Not for quite some time has a work by law professors attracted
this much attention. What explains it? Most scholarship in normative law and
economics is, in effect, applied ethics—arguing that one or another legal rule
is efﬁcient or welfare maximizing. Fairness versus Welfare is more fundamental.
It seeks to set the agenda for the ﬁeld, indeed for normative legal scholarship
generally. Its central claim: that normative analysis of legal rules (at least by
scholars if not governmental ofﬁcials or laypersons) should focus solely on “social
welfare” and should ignore “fairness” considerations. Fairness versus Welfare has
the same purpose as Richard Posner’s famous defense of wealth maximization
a generation ago: to defend and entrench a single criterion as the basis for all
scholarly evaluation of law.
The position that FW defends is, in effect, Paretian consequentialist welfarism plus a full-information preferentialist account of welfare. Legal rules
should be evaluated in light of their outcomes. The goodness of an outcome,
in turn, is solely a function of individual well-being. Well-being is identiﬁed as
the satisfaction of fully informed preferences. Kaplow and Shavell assume that
preferences are measurable by utility functions, and, if so, their position can be
expressed as follows. The goodness of outcome x is determined by a social welfare
function F(U1(x),U 2(x), . . . Un(x)), where the Ui are individual utility functions
measuring each individual’s preferences, and where F is an increasing function
of the Ui (24). The Pareto principle in its strong variant is therefore preserved.
If Ui(x) 1 Ui(y) for at least one individual i, and there is no individual j such that
Uj(x) ! Uj(y), then if F is an increasing function of individual utilities it follows
that F(x) 1 F(y).
Crucially, FW does not take a position as to the speciﬁc form of the social
welfare function. Any increasing function of utilities that satisﬁes an anonymity
constraint will do or, at least, is not ruled out by Kaplow and Shavell (24–27).
In particular, Kaplow and Shavell are not committed to utilitarianism. Fairness
versus Welfare is a generic defense of Paretian welfarism, and “fairness” is deﬁned
by contrast. A “fairness” approach is anything other than Paretian welfarism:
any theory that gives some weight to considerations other than the maximization
of some social welfare function (39). This is a big tent. Corrective justice theories
of tort law, promissory theories of contract law, participatory accounts of legal
procedure, and retributivist views of criminal law all come under the rubric of
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fairness, as deﬁned by Kaplow and Shavell, and all are vigorously criticized.
Indeed, normative legal scholarship outside law and economics almost always
has some nonwelfarist element. So, despite the generic, not necessarily utilitarian, cast of FW, its critical target is also very large.
Kaplow and Shavell attack the target with gusto, at times lapsing into a
polemical, even scornful tone. And much of the response to FW has been unfavorable, often quite hostile. All this sound and fury has obscured the fact that
this new brief for normative law and economics is, substantively, a genuine
advance over the traditional commitment to wealth maximization—a position
that Posner himself has abandoned but that is still reﬂected in much legal
scholarship and policy analysis. Wealth maximization or its close cousin, KaldorHicks efﬁciency, has little plausibility as a moral criterion, let alone a decisive
one. By contrast, the fact that a legal rule increases overall welfare is, pro tanto,
a good moral reason to adopt the rule. To be sure, FW argues for social welfare
as a full framework for evaluation, not merely a pro tanto criterion. But its
position, Paretian welfarist consequentialism, is a live position within contemporary moral philosophy and is the dominant view in theoretical welfare economics and social choice theory. Unlike wealth maximization, Kaldor-Hicks efﬁciency, or utilitarianism, Paretian welfarist consequentialism is potentially
sensitive to the distribution of welfare. Again, FW’s social welfare function is any
function for ranking outcomes that depends solely on individual utilities, increases with them, and satisﬁes an anonymity constraint. This includes straight
utilitarian aggregation, but it also includes a “prioritarian” function that gives
greater weight to the welfare of individuals with lower welfare levels.
Fairness versus Welfare departs from traditional law and economics in other
ways. Kaplow and Shavell reject or at least decline to defend the following
problematic positions, all standardly associated (at least in the past) with law
and economics: (1) Preferences are revealed choices. Kaplow and Shavell reject this
behaviorist view (410 n. 24) and accept the better view that sees preferences as
attitudes which may be imperfectly revealed by choices. (2) The exogeneity of
preferences. Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that preferences can change and
that law can shape preferences (413–18). (3) The impossibility of interpersonal welfare
comparisons. Skepticism about comparability is what motivated the development
of the Kaldor-Hicks standard. Kaplow and Shavell, by contrast, accept that utilities
are interpersonally comparable to some extent (24 n. 15). (4) Antipaternalism.
Since welfare consists in the satisfaction of fully informed rather than actual
preferences, Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that individuals can be mistaken
about their own welfare and that government regulation of individual choice
might be justiﬁed even absent externalities (410–13). (5) Market solutions. Kaplow
and Shavell do not argue that the market is presumptively better at maximizing
social welfare than regulation. The aim of FW is to defend a moral view, not
the additional claim that this view favors a certain set of institutional structures,
for example, market ones. (6) Distribution through taxes and transfers. Kaplow and
Shavell, in other work, have advanced a particular institutional claim, namely,
that distributive considerations are best handled by the tax-and-transfer system
rather than regulation, common law doctrines, or other legal rules. In FW,
Kaplow and Shavell do not reject this claim, but neither does it play a signiﬁcant
role in their argument.
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Substantively, then, FW represents a pretty plausible view. Deontologists, of
course, will rebel at the authors’ consequentialism; consequentialists who believe
in a consequentialism of rights, or in a responsibility-sensitive consequentialism,
will rebel at their strict welfarism; certain egalitarians will take issue with their
Paretianism, arguing that equality may require “leveling down”; and rule consequentialists will object to their act centrism. But Paretian welfarist (act) consequentialism should certainly be on the table, and Kaplow and Shavell have
cleaved away various economic dogmas, just mentioned, that are inessential to
the view.
Why, then, the heated critical response to FW ? Part of the answer is its
polemical tone and the fact that the authors are often uncharitable in their
reading of particular fairness theories. Fairness versus Welfare includes separate
chapters discussing tort law, contract law, legal procedure, and criminal law,
which are larded with references to the relevant nonwelfarist scholarship. Still,
one feels that Kaplow and Shavell have not sympathetically engaged this scholarship. They haven’t really read it. Kaplow and Shavell repeatedly accuse nonwelfarists of having an incomplete theory or of failing entirely to address some
issue, and these accusations are often overstated. To give but one illustrative
example, they complain that corrective justice theorists of tort law have not
explained what makes acts wrongful (93–96). This is absurd: although there is
as yet no consensus account of wrongfulness in this area, individual corrective
justice theorists surely have furnished their own accounts, and although the
individual accounts may well be incomplete or unspeciﬁed in some ways, so is
FW’s account of social welfare (which, remember, is any increasing, anonymous
function of individual utilities).
Moreover, one of the two main arguments for welfarism that Kaplow and
Shavell advance is a nonstarter. The structure of FW is the following. An introductory part articulates and clariﬁes the authors’ position, and a concluding
section adds further clariﬁcation. In the lengthy middle portion of the book,
Kaplow and Shavell consider in turn the four areas of tort law, contract law,
procedural law, and criminal law. In each of these areas, Kaplow and Shavell
argue against fairness in two principal ways. First, they consider salient doctrinal
issues, such as the choice between strict-liability, negligence, or no-liability rules
of tort law; the choice between speciﬁc performance, expectation damages, and
reliance damages as the remedy for breach of contract; the choice between
procedural doctrines that allow suit, subsidize suit, or prohibit suit; or the choice
between a punishment rule that requires the sanction to be proportional to the
crime and one that allows disproportionate sanctions. Using a wide range of
simple fact patterns, Kaplow and Shavell illustrate how pursuing fairness can
reduce social welfare. Second, Kaplow and Shavell argue that the intuitions
favoring fairness views are a product of social norms or inborn dispositions.
These norms and dispositions have evolved to maximize social welfare and do
so both by reducing individual opportunism and by serving as heuristics that
ordinary individuals properly employ, given their cognitive limitations and deliberation costs. But the intuitions are no substitute for welfarist deliberation by
legal experts, and, indeed—here’s the nub of Kaplow and Shavell’s second
argument—once we understand the origin of these intuitions, their force in
justifying fairness views evaporates.

Book Reviews

827

This second argument is a muddle, as Jules Coleman has shown at length
(“The Grounds of Welfare,” Yale Law Journal 112 [2003]: 1511–43). Fairness versus
Welfare’s explanation of why norms and dispositions would evolve to maximize
social welfare is sketchy. And even if that explanation persuades, Kaplow and
Shavell haven’t done the epistemological work to show that explaining intuitions
vitiates their role in good moral reasoning. If we’re naturalists about intuitions,
they are all explainable, and Kaplow and Shavell’s view would imply that the
Rawlsian, reﬂective-equilibrium account of justiﬁed moral beliefs (which has a
role for intuitions) is incorrect. Maybe it is, but Kaplow and Shavell haven’t
given us a replacement account and, indeed, repeatedly appeal to the reader’s
intuitions in favor of welfare and Pareto improvements. Perhaps Kaplow and
Shavell might respond, here, that the fairness intuitions they mean to criticize
are no more than concrete reactions about particular cases, while welfarist intuitions are systematized through the much more general construct of “welfare.”
But fairness intuitions, too, are systematized through general notions like autonomy, responsibility, rights, wrongs, property, promises, and compensation.
What about the ﬁrst argument for welfarism: that any theory which pursues
fairness can reduce social welfare? This may seem to be a tautology. Actually, it
isn’t. It isn’t even true. Fairness theories give some role, even a small one, to
considerations other than social welfare; thus a tiebreaker theory which gave
lexical priority to social welfare over nonwelfarist considerations would be a
fairness theory (by Kaplow and Shavell’s deﬁnition) and yet never reduce social
welfare. So the authors can’t be accused, as some critics have done, of wasting
hundreds of pages demonstrating a tautology. But let’s not quibble about the
meaning of “tautology.” The leading nonwelfarist accounts of tort law, contract
law, adjudicative procedure, and criminal law do not give lexical priority to social
welfare over nonwelfarist considerations. Once it is recognized that they don’t,
it is immediately obvious that these accounts can reduce social welfare. So are
the numerous concrete examples that Kaplow and Shavell deploy in the middle
part of their book a waste of time? I think not. The examples are useful in just
the way hypothetical cases generally are for moral reasoning, spawning intuitions
that might sway nonwelfarists toward welfarism (or vice versa) and forcing nonwelfarists (and welfarists) to further specify their views. For example, what does
retributive justice demand where disproportionate penalties lead to fewer crimes
and a lower rate of conviction of the innocent (336–39)? Where tort liability
doesn’t tend to induce precaution, and the costs of administering a liability
system are high, and it seems roughly equally likely ex ante that a given person
will be an injurer or a victim, why would corrective justice still demand a regime
of strict liability or negligence (100–106)?
Moreover, there is a general claim that Kaplow and Shavell seek to illustrate
with their numerous fact-patterns that is far from obvious, namely, that any
fairness theory can reduce everyone’s welfare. For any such theory, they claim,
there exists some choice situation where the legal rule required by the theory
is Pareto inferior to an alternative. In particular, consider symmetric situations,
where everyone is identically situated with respect to welfare. In such a situation,
the legal rule chosen by a social welfare function that increases in individual
utilities will be best for everyone, and any theory which requires a different
choice will be worse for everyone (52).
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This is a crucial line of argument. The claim that any nonwelfarist theory
will, in some possible situation, require a Pareto-inferior choice is an arresting
and important claim and constitutes a truly original contribution to the philosophical debate about welfarism. Unfortunately, the claim is underdeveloped
in FW (52–58). Imagine, once more, a fairness theory that gives lexical priority
to social welfare over nonwelfarist considerations. Or imagine the sort of theory
that Howard Chang describes, one that generally pursues nonwelfarist considerations but gives lexical priority to the Pareto principle (“A Liberal Theory of
Social Welfare,” Yale Law Journal 110 [2000]: 173–258). Why would these hybrid
theories ever require Pareto-inferior moves? Kaplow and Shavell’s answer, presented most crisply in a technical article, is that the Pareto principle plus a
continuity requirement implies welfarism (“Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy
Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle,” Journal of Political Economy 109 [2001]:
281–86). Continuity means, very roughly, that small changes in some determinant of the social ordering of outcomes or choices don’t produce large changes
in the ordering. But why is continuity a morally compelling axiom for the consequentialist, let alone the nonconsequentialist? Consider the “leximin” principle, much mooted in the social choice literature since Rawls: priority in ranking
outcomes is given ﬁrst to the welfare of the worst off, then the second-to-worst
off, and so on. A leximin social ordering satisﬁes Paretian welfarist consequentialism but is discontinuous in individual utilities.
Kaplow and Shavell seem to have concluded that a full-blown discussion of
the conditions under which the Pareto principle implies welfarism and a full
defense of those conditions as desiderata for any moral theory would have been
too difﬁcult for FW’s intended audience of law professors. Perhaps so. But,
conversely, a book incorporating that discussion and defense would have been
of much greater interest to philosophers and social choice theorists.
Two additional observations: (1) Kaplow and Shavell assume that welfare
is measurable and interpersonally comparable but say little about how to construct an interpersonally comparable scale of well-being. It is a standard result
in social choice theory that, if utilities are interpersonally comparable but represent only welfare levels and differences (rather than, say, ratios), welfarism
plus a few other uncontroversial axioms imply that the social ordering is either
leximin or a kind of utilitarianism (Salvador Barberà, Peter J. Hammond, and
Christian Seidl, eds., Handbook of Utility Theory [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998], 1:418).
So Kaplow and Shavell face the trilemma of requiring a high degree of precision
in measuring welfare, abandoning the possibility of a distributively sensitive social
ordering, or abandoning their commitment to continuity. (2) Kaplow and Shavell
equate welfare with the satisfaction of fully informed preferences, refusing to
“restrict” preferences as some preferentialist accounts of well-being do—for example, by not counting the satisfaction of sadistic or otherwise objectionable
preferences, or moral preferences, as welfare enhancing (418–43). It is a truism
that individuals, even rational and fully informed ones, can choose to sacriﬁce
their own interests. What someone wants and what someone wants for herself
are possibly different. Kaplow and Shavell’s position precludes this possibility.
Matthew D. Adler
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